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CHOICE OF LAW IN
CONTRACT ACTIONS INVOLVING
FOREIGN NATIONALS
T. L. TOLAN, JR.*
Intensive study of the conflict of laws requires the soul of a
philosopher. Few of us are so equipped. Hence we sometimes resort
to pat answers (often disguised in Latin); or, if we dig deeper in
the cases, we are inclined to despair. Practicing lawyers have little
difficulty in finding "the answer" to many legal problems. It takes
either courage or foolhardiness or both to give a firm opinion on what
law governs the interpretation of a contract between residents of two
states, negotiated, say, by mail, and calling for performance in one or
another-or a third-of the states.
Another logical problem is added if suit is in a Federal court. But
since the Erie1 case, the Supreme Court of the United States has been
loyal to the logic of that decision. Logic has seemed to compel its
extension to conflict of laws rules applied by state courts. And in the
Klaxon' case the Court confirmed this logic and held that a Federal
court in a diversity case must seek the result of the conflict of law
rules which would be applied if suit had been brought in the local state
court.
But Erie and Klaxon concerned suits between citizens of different
states of the United States. Does their rule apply if one of the parties
is a citizen of a foreign nation? Some courts have held that it does3-
but without discussion and presumably without argument of the point
by counsel. The Supreme Court has never considered the question. I
suggest that application of Erie to actions involving contracts in which
a foreign national is a party may well be a mistake; that in these
cases, at least, Federal courts should fashion their own body of con-
flict of laws in this situation; and-a more far-reaching step, of course
-that that body of law should bind the state courts as well.
I may as well admit at the outset that I have become convinced by
the arguments in favor of these suggestions. What follows is a brief
in their support rather than either a balanced or a scholarly discussion
* Partner, Brady, Tyrrell & Bruce; B.A. Yale 1945; J.D. Michigan Law School
1948; Law Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, to Mr. Justice Mkfurphy,
1948-1949, and Mr. Justice Clark, 1949-1950.
' Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). I shall not attempt a bibliogra-
phy of even recent comments on this case, which is now being subjected to
academic attack. See, for example, Keeffe, Gilhooley, Baily and Day, "Weary
Erie", 34 Cornell L. Q. 494 (1949).
2 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
3 See, for one of many examples, Plotnick v. Pennsylvania Smelting & Re-
fining Co., 194 F.2d 859 (3rd Cir. 1952).
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of alternative possibilities. One reason for this approach is that the
opposing arguments seem (to me) both obvious and faulty. It is easy
to argue that a diversity case is a diversity case, whether the diverse
citizens are of different United States or different nations; that the
Rules of Decisions Act4 does not differentiate between the two situa-
tions; that a Federal rule as opposed to application of State law en-
courages forum-shopping, the vice Erie was supposed to halt; and that
one encourages diversity jurisdiction by fashioning a Federal rule here,
and modern thinking encourages the contraction of that jurisdiction
when Federal courts are no longer assumed to be always more just
than state courts. There are other arguments, including the "right" of
the separate sovereign states in our federal system to make their own
rules. The reader may judge whether these "obvious" arguments are,
in fact, faulty, as I contend-or are at least outweighed by other con-
siderations-after reading what is set out below.
I.
THEORETICAL BASIS OF AN ARGUMENT THAT
FEDERAL LAW SHOULD GOVERN
Erie and Klaxon were decided in the setting of that part of Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution which states:
The judicial power shall extend to . . . controversies . . . be-
tween citizens of different states....
Neither the Klaxon case nor any other case in the Supreme Court
of the United States which I have found holds that the law of the state
in which the Federal court is sitting must or should be applied when
the action involves a controversy "between a state, or the citizens there-
of, and foreign States, citizens or subjects", under the last clause of
the first paragraph of Article III, Section 2, of the United States Con-
stitution. In fact, the indications are that Federal rather than state
conflicts rules should be applied to these cases, for they involve the
international relationships of the United States Government and the
relations between its citizens and those of foreign countries. Tradi-
tionally, of course, these have been matters for the Congress of the
United States, and the Executive and Senate under the treaty power,
rather than a matter for the individual states. Federal control over the
international relations of U.S. citizens and their rights as against foreign
powers and their subjects is too firmly embedded in the history of our
country to require restatement here. It was a central purpose for the
adoption of the Constitution. The Supreme Court made this apparent
in 1937 when it declared, with reference to an international agreement:
[C]omplete power over international affairs is in the national
government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment
or interference on the part of the several states .... In respect
4 62 Stat. 944 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §1652 (1959).
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of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of
our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such
purposes the State of New York does not exist.5 (Emphasis
added).
Logic would suggest that a uniform system of law enforced by
Federal courts should also be applied in suits involving U.S. citizens
and the subjects of a foreign king or other foreign sovereign. In a
1947 case involving the rights of the United States to recover the sums
paid to and on behalf of its soldiers because of the torts of others, the
Supreme Court stated the reasons why it may be held that Erie should
not apply to suits by foreign nationals:
The great object of the Erie case was to secure in the federal
courts, in diversity cases, the application of the same substantive
law as would control if the suit were brought in the courts of
the state where the federal court sits. It was the so-called
'federal common law' utilized as a substitute for state power, to
create and enforce legal relationships in the area set apart in our
scheme for state rather than for federal control, that the Erie
decision threw out. Its object and effect were thus to bring
federal judicial power under subjection to state authority in
matters essentially of local interest and state control.
Conversely there was no purpose or effect for broadening
state power over matters essentially of federal character or for
determining whether issues are of that nature. The diversity
jurisdiction had not created special problems of that sort. Ac-
cordingly the Erie decision, which related only to the law to be
applied in exercise of that jurisdiction, had no effect, and was
intended to have none, to bring within the governance of state
law matters exclusively federal, because made so by constitu-
tional or valid congressional command, or other so vitally affect-
ing interests, Powers and relations of the Federal Government
as to require uniform national disposition rather than diversified
state rulings. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
at 366-368. Hence, although federal judicial power to deal with
common-law problems was cut down in the realm of liability or
its absence governable by state law, that power remained un-
impaired for dealing independently, wherever necessary or ap-
propriate, with essentially federal matters, even though Congress
has not acted affirmatively about the specific question.6 (Emphasis
added).
Justice Jackson saw fit to observe, by way of footnote, in a 1942
concurring opinion:
• . . [T]he common-law doctrines of conflict of laws worked
out in a unitary system to deal with conflicts between domestic
and truly foreign law may not apply unmodified in conflicts be-
5 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).6 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947).
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tween the laws of states within our federal system which are
affected by the full faith and credit or other relevant clause of
the Constitution.7
The Erie doctrine has been held inapplicable in other cases not
involving diversity, and arising under other clauses of Article III-
bankruptcy8 and U.S. Government obligations. 9 Perhaps the most
notable recent example of the application of Federal law to contracts
which had previously been considered to be governed largely by state
law was the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Lincoln Mills.1" That case decided that the section in the Taft-Hartley
Act which appeared merely to give Federal courts jurisdiction of the
parties in suits for violations of labor contracts, had the effect of con-
verting all collective bargaining contracts (in industries affecting com-
merce) into Federal contracts, requiring the application of Federal
rather than state law, and calling for the application of "judicial in-
ventiveness"' 2 in applying Federal rules of interpretation and decision.
One commentator has described this decision as a "chink in the armor"
of Erie."
Converting what has always been understood to be a State matter
into Federal subject-by whatever theoretical gymnastics-could be a
prelude to a holding that when foreign nationals are involved, a uni-
form Federal rule should be applied rather than a state rule. The sug-
gestion of a leading scholar in the field of conflict of laws, made in 1941,
has not been followed, but it has not authoritatively been rejected
either. Professor Cheatham argued that the Erie rule should not be
followed when a foreign national is involved:
For in all aspects of foreign relations, it is natural that the
agency of the central government should be dominant. It would
seem natural for the federal rule choosing between the law of
Illinois and the law of France, or between the law of France
and the law of Germany, to be binding on the state courts rather
than the reverse.1 4
7D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 472
at n. 10 (1942).
s Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946).
9Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
10 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
11 Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §185 (1958).
2 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 10 at 457.
13 Kauper, "Supreme Court: Trends in Constitutional Interpretation", 24 F.R.D.
155, 164 (1959). Of course the bankruptcy, admiralty, United States Govern-
ment obligation and even collective bargaining contract cases may be dis-
missed as inapplicable here, because they involve federal questions, not
diversity cases. The collective bargaining cases, for example, are based upon
a statute which specifically eliminates the requirement of diverse citizenship.
14 Cheatham, Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 430,
447, (1941).
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Further, a kind of federal pre-emption argument may be available,
based upon the treaty power. Many treaties pick the law which shall be
applied, some on the basis of contract and others by direct reference-
naming the law of the country which is to be applied.1" Many treaties
are so stated that they are of no real help to the practitioner-for
example the statement in the 1852 Treaty between the United States
and Argentina to the effect that the contract between nationals of the
two countries is "subject to general laws and usages of the two coun-
tries.'1 6 There surely can be little question that if a treaty does in
fact state the rule of conflicts to be applied, it governs; here is cer-
tainly an appropriate subject on which to exercise the treaty power.
In view of the numerous treaties on this general subject, and the need
for a national rule noted below, can it not be argued that the very
treaty power given to the Executive and the Senate by the Constitution
in effect pre-empts the field even though a particular treaty may not
cover the case at bar? One analogy for such a holding is the dichotomy
set out in the Cooley case' 7 and followed ever since, with respect to
interstate commerce: States may not act even though Congress has
not acted in those areas which are deemed exclusively Federal in na-
ture, since a uniform national rule is necessary.
II.
PRACTICAL REASONS FOR THE APPLICATION
OF THE FEDERAL RULE
One of the principal justifications for the Erie rule was that it dis-
couraged forum-shopping: when a federal court became "just another
court of a state,""' the person who will bring suit in that state will not
get a different result based upon different rules of substantive law
prevailing in the state and federal courts in the jurisdiction in question.
Quite an argument can be made that this reason for Erie should lead
to a uniform Federal rule, rather than application of the Erie rule, when
a foreign national is involved in a contract case. Ordinarily the foreign
national has his contract with a corporation which has offices in a
number of places in the United States; if he can choose in which state
to bring his action on the basis of what substantive rules of choice of
law'" will be applied among the various states in which he may bring
25 Bayitch, "Conflict Law in United States Treaties". This book was first pub-
lished in the Miami Law Quarterly, to which the following citations refer.16 Bayitch, supra., 8 Miami L. Q. at 512. Lex locus delicti is stated to apply
in the 1938 treaty between the United States and Liberia, 8 Miami L. Q. at
509 & n. 37. A relatively rare provision is that transfer of property is to be
made "under the provisions of the laws of the jurisdiction in which the prop-
erty is found." United States- Sweden treaty of 1910, Article XIV, 4, cited
at 9 Miami L. Q. at 126-7. See also the treaty between the United States and
Germany discussed in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
17 Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851).
is Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
19 1 recognize that many of the same arguments in this paper apply with equal
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suit, "forum-shopping" is encouraged rather than discouraged by the
Erie rule.
Probably the most potent policy reason in favor of a Federal rule
is the damage which might be done by a parochial state court to the
foreign relations of the United States. Federal judges are at least
presumed to have more knowledge about these implications. For ex-
ample, suppose there is litigation between an American and a prominent
Arabian national involving the terms of a contract for the sale of
Arabian oil. It may be that the United States Department of State
would want to appear as amicus curiae in such litigation. Its views
would certainly be entitled to consideration. Is not a national court apt
to provide a more sympathetic attitude in considering the delicacies of
international relations, than many state courts ?
Another practical reason in support of a uniform federal rule is
that there might be somewhat greater certainty involved in the applica-
tion of conflict of laws principles if the Federal courts, under the
guidance of the Supreme Court of the United States, were able to
establish the rule. Even as prosaic and black-letter an authority as
American Jurisprudence has remarked as follows on the state of the
law with respect to choice of law rules on the interpretation of con-
tracts in the courts of the several states:
It is apparent from an examination of the rules and authori-
ties cited in the three following sections that there is more con-
fusion in this field of conflict of laws than in any other. Even
upon a casual inspection of the authorities, the reader is met with
the apparently illogical situation that all three rules-the place of
making, the place of performance, and the place of intent-are
cited as the controlling principle. Very generally, and often in a
particular jurisdiction, any one or two and even all three of these
principles have been laid down in different cases, and occasional-
ly, even in the same case .... As a rule no effort has been made
to distinguish between the problems and either one rule or an-
other has been generally quoted and applied in a very desultory
and irresponsible fashion.20
While the same comment could be applied to decisions of the Federal
courts until fairly recently, some order now seems to be emerging from
the chaos. Chief judge Magruder evinced the trend by his explanation
in a 1950 admiralty case in which the question was choice of law in
the interpretation of a contract:
But at least where the contract contains no explicit provision
that it is to be governed by some particular law, what the courts
force to the question of whether there should be a "Federal Common Law"
not just in choice of law, but also in all substantive legal questions, when a
foreign national is involved; but I will not explore these broader implications
here.
20 11 Am. Jur. Conflict of Laws §116.
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applying this intention test actually seem to do is to examine
all the points of contact which the transaction has with the two
or more jurisdictions involved with a view to determining the
'center of gravity' of the contract, or of that aspect of the con-
tract immediately before the court; and when they have identi-
fied the jurisdiction with which the matter at hand is predom-
inantly or most intimately concerned, they conclude that this is
the proper law of the contract which the parties presumably
had in view at the time of contracting ... In the infinite variety
of circumstances presenting choice of law problems relating to
contracts, it is safe to say that there is no simple and dependable
rule of thumb by which the choice may be unerringly made. 21
And in 1946 the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Black, had suggested a similar test for choosing the law to be applied
in the interpretation of a contract:
But obligations, such as the one here for interest, often have
significant contacts in many states, so that the question of which
particular state's law should measure the obligation seldom
lends itself to simple solution. In determining which contact
is the most significant in a particular transaction, courts can
seldom find a complete solution in the mechanical formulae of
the conflicts of law. Determination requires the exercise of an
informed judgment in the balancing of all the interests of the
states with the most significant contacts in order to best accom-
modate the equities among the parties to the policies of those
states.22
Thus the "center of gravity" or "sum of the contacts" rule appears
to be becoming prevalent in the Federal courts. It is impossible to
make anything of the confusion in the views expressed by the state
courts and, from personal experience, the writer can testify to the
scorn with which foreign nationals view the total lack of certainty
available in American law on what appears to be a rather simple issue.
CONCLUSION
I repeat that this is not intended as a scholarly discussion and that
there is no attempt to be either exhaustive or balanced. It is a sug-
gestion that the rule for which this brief outline has been prepared is
one which is best from a policy standpoint and has firm theoretical
bases which could support it. There is nothing to prevent the Supreme
Court of the United States from adopting the suggestion which is here-
by commended to it.
21Jansson v. Swedish American Line, 185 F.2d 212, 218-219 (1st Cir. 1950).
22 Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, supra note 8 at 161-162.
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